Telescope Time Without Tears: A Distributed Approach to Peer Review by Merrifield, Michael R. & Saari, Donald G.
Telescope time without tears –    
a distributed approach to peer review 
 
Michael Merrifield and Donald Saari describe a new procedure designed to take the stress 
out of allocating the limited time available on telescopes. 
 
Abstract 
The procedure that is currently employed to allocate time on telescopes is horribly 
onerous on those unfortunate astronomers who serve on the committees that 
administer the process, and is in danger of complete collapse as the number of 
applications steadily increases.  Here, an alternative is presented, whereby the task is 
distributed around the astronomical community, with a suitable mechanism design 
established to steer the outcome toward awarding this precious resource to those 
projects where there is a consensus across the community that the science is most 
exciting and innovative. 
 
 
Most of the cutting-edge telescopes that are in use around the World today are heavily oversubscribed, 
with typically five or ten times more nights needed to carry out the projects that astronomers want to 
do than are available.  This valuable limited resource is therefore usually allocated by a rather 
complicated competitive process in which individuals or research collaborations submit applications 
describing the projects they wish to carry out; these applications are then assessed by a review panel of 
maybe five or six astronomers, and the best of them are approved and allocated time on the telescope.   
One of the authors (MRM) has been motivated to contemplate the shortcomings of this procedure by 
the presence on his desk of a bulging file of 113 telescope applications that he had been sent to assess 
as a member of the European Southern Observatory (ESO) Observing Programme Committee.  In a 
desperate attempt to put off burying himself under this mountain of paperwork, he got to thinking 
about the way we assess telescope applications, and was struck by a number of points about the current 
process. 
First, it is not reasonable to place this burden of assessment on such a small fraction of the community.  
Although the load averages out over time to an extent as members cycle on and off panels, some people 
repeatedly duck their share of the work, or do such a bad job of it the first time that they are never 
invited again, so the work is not fairly distributed even over the long term.   
Second, no matter how good one’s intentions, one simply cannot do as good a job as the task deserves.  
ESO allows three weeks to complete the task of assessing these 113 proposals, on top of the typical 
university lecturer’s full schedule of teaching and the occasional grabbed moment for research.  Even 
paring things down to 15 minutes assessing each proposal, and five minutes to assign a score and write 
up some comments, we are still talking about an entire working week doing nothing else, on top of the 
several days of meetings required to thrash out a finalized list through panel meetings.  And even if we 
could compromise on the work that we are actually being paid to do sufficiently to create this much 
time, it would still be impossible to do a satisfactory job, as there is no way that anyone can maintain a 
big picture sense of the quality of such a large pile of submitted proposals: it is impossible to control 
against drifts in the grades assigned to allow a fair comparison between Proposal 1 and Proposal 113, 
which is required for them to be ranked properly against each other. 
Third, there is really very little control to ensure that those involved take the process seriously.  Indeed, 
as mentioned above, there is actually a disincentive to do so, since acquiring a reputation for doing this 
job well simply invites more of it to be heaped upon you.  There is obviously  some benefit to the 
individual who serves on such panels, since one gets an interesting overview of what is currently 
exercising the broader astronomical community, obtains valuable insights into the peculiarities of the 
organization’s particular system, and also learns some of the basic pitfalls into which a surprisingly large 
number of applications fall (how can anyone write an application to observe 317 stars without 
somewhere demonstrating that one could not achieve the main science goals with 12 objects?).  
However, it would be hard to argue that these returns outweigh the costs in terms of time, and in fact 
the benefits accrue no matter how bad a job one does of the reviewing.  Ultimately, the system relies to 
an uncomfortable extent upon panel members’ work ethics, and the rather crude incentive of not 
wanting to appear ill-informed in front of their peers on the panel. 
Fourth, it should be borne in mind that there is no objective right answer in this kind of peer review 
process.  Ideally, one would like to produce a single ordered list that ranks the scientific merit of the 
individual proposals, so that one can work down the list assigning the available telescope time to the 
best applications.  However, this ideal is at best an over-simplification and at worst a complete fantasy.  
Even within a single sub-field of astronomy, there is no single, objective way to weigh up a highly 
speculative proposal that would revolutionize the subject if it paid off against a more run-of-the-mill 
incremental study.  When one then tries to compare disparate topics, there is absolutely no rational 
basis for deciding whether a definitive study of, say, quasar activity is more or less important than one 
on exoplanets.  The unachievability of an objective ranking of applications does not mean that one 
should not try, but it does imply that it is not worth investing ever greater efforts to improve the 
precision of the ranked list when there is such a fundamental limitation on its accuracy. 
Finally, this issue is not going to go away.  For the reasons outlined above, we would argue that the 
system is already broken in that it is unreasonably burdensome and less than optimal in its outcome 
because of its excessive load, and this situation is only likely to get worse with time: ESO’s total 
applications have gone up from around 500 per half-year a decade ago to more than a thousand in the 
latest round, and there are no signs that this number is saturating.  Indeed, there is a real danger of an 
element of positive feedback, in that as the system becomes more overloaded it becomes less effective, 
so applicants recognize that there is a larger random element in winning telescope time, and accordingly 
“buy more lottery tickets” by putting in larger numbers of applications. 
So, how does one go about improving on the current overly-burdensome system?  Clearly, something 
rather radical is required to stop us from sinking under an ever-expanding sea of assessment, but any 
new system should still meet a number of basic principles: 
 Some incentive should be put in place to reduce the pressure toward ever more applications. 
 The workload of assessment should be shared equitably around the community. 
 The burden on each individual should be maintained at a reasonable level so that it is physically 
possible to do a fair and thorough job. 
 There should be some positive incentive to do the task well. 
 The ultimate ranked list of applications should be as objective a representation of the 
community’s perception of their relative scientific merits as possible.  
Many of the issues involved are clearly not specific to astronomy, and there already exists a great deal of 
literature on “mechanism design” to optimize this kind of process.  In his attempts to put off assessing 
telescope proposals by learning more about the subject, MRM came into contact with this work’s co-
author (DGS) who has extensive expertise in both astrophysics and the mathematical theory of voting 
and its associated complexities.  The remainder of this paper is a proposal arising from the discussions 
that the authors have held, which is designed to be less onerous on any individual, but still meet the 
above principles, and, in particular, result in a ranked list of telescope applications that as closely as 
possible reflects the community’s view of their relative merits. 
 
A distributed approach to peer review 
Here, then, is an outline proposal for a process to replace the current peer review model for telescope 
time allocations: 
1. As now, principal investigators (PIs) submit proposals against a set deadline, specifying in which 
sub-field their applications lie. 
2. After the deadline, each of these N PIs is sent m proposals from other applicants in their sub-
field. 
3. If the PI has a conflict of interest (institutional or personal) on any application, he declares it as 
in most current refereeing processes, and the application is replaced by an alternate. 
4. The PI assesses these m applications, and compiles a ranked list, placing them in the order in 
which she thinks the community would rank them, not her personal preferences.  How she 
carries out this process is up to the PI: she could, for example, call on the combined views of her 
co-applicants, or delegate the task to one co-investigator.  As now, she is not allowed to 
communicate with the applicants on the proposals she is assessing. 
5. The PIs all submit their ranked list of m applications.  Failure to carry out this refereeing duty by 
a set deadline would lead to the PI’s own proposal being automatically removed from the 
ranking: the refereeing element should be viewed as much a part of the application as any 
other, and not carrying it out means that the proposal is incomplete and should be rejected. 
6. These individual sub-lists of rankings are then combined to produce an optimized global list 
ranking all N applications. 
7. Finally, each PI’s individual rankings are compared to the positions of the same m applications in 
the globally-optimized list.  If both lists appear in approximately the same order, then the PI has 
done a good job and is rewarded by having his application moved a modest number of places up 
the final list relative to those from PIs who have not predicted the community’s view so well. 
At this point, the lists from different sub-fields could be handed over to a conventional telescope 
allocation committee to merge the lists with some degree of human intervention, as the amount of 
work involved is now reduced to very manageable proportions: the allocation panel has simply to work 
down their ranked lists, merging them appropriately, so the work involved scales only with the available 
telescope time, not the number of applications.  However, one could also imagine simply going down 
each list allocating pro-rata on the historic record of the number of applications or hours requested in 
each sub-field, which, in practice, is what tends to happen anyway.   
This process seems to at least meet the general principles set out above:   
 It shares the workload widely around the community, weighting appropriately towards those 
who submit the largest number of applications.   
 This weighting also provides a disincentive against the lottery-ticket approach to telescope 
applications, or at the very least makes the individual applicants take responsibility for the extra 
workload that this approach generates. 
 The load on any individual does not go up if the number of applications increases. 
 If the value of m is chosen appropriately and the combining algorithm is designed robustly, the 
system has sufficient redundancy to be insensitive to outliers and attempts to subvert the 
process. 
 It explicitly seeks to produce a list that reflects the views of the entire community, both by 
spreading the process more widely and by focusing referees’ minds on considering the broad 
interests of the community rather than their individual preferences.  
 It provides a transparent, positive incentive to do a good job. 
However, as usual, the devil is in the detail.  Below, we delve a little deeper into the practicalities of 
implementing such a scheme, and present some simulations to test whether it might work in practice.  
 
Creating the global ordered list 
The first challenge in this process involves the combination of the individual PIs’ lists into the globally-
optimized rank order.  In effect, this is an electoral process, and there is a long and extensive literature 
on what the optimum method is for deciding the outcome of such an election from the individual votes, 
which we can draw on for this application. 
Interestingly, there is already an astronomical connection with this literature, in that one of the seminal 
contributions was made in the late eighteenth century by Jean-Charles de Borda.  As well as being 
involved in the definition of the metre based on estimates of the Earth’s circumference and designing 
various related astrometric instruments (and, incidentally, recalculating all the trigonometric tables 
based on a circle divided into 400 degrees), Borda also came up with an algorithm for combining voters’ 
individual preference lists to decide who wins an election (Borda 1781).  In a slate of N candidates, this 
“Borda count” involves assigning N–1 points for each first preference vote cast, N–2 for each second 
choice, down to 0 for a last choice.  This scoring mechanism in fact just comprises comparing the 
candidates in pairs and counting up the number of contests each candidate wins.  Suppose, for example, 
there were three candidates, A, B and C, which a voter chose to rank in this order.  If the voter mentally 
carried out pair-wise comparisons between all possible combinations, A would win two contests 
(beating both B and C), B would win one contest against C, and C would not score any wins at all.  One 
then simply sums the Borda counts assigned to each candidate by every voter, with the winner of the 
election being the candidate with the highest score, and so on down the list of runners up to create a 
global ranked list.  In the case of the current process, where each assessor only ranks m applications, 
one adopts a “modified Borda count” (MBC) in which the points allocated count down from m–1 to 0 in 
each sub-list, giving each application a total score between 0 and m(m–1), which can be mapped into 
the range 0 < MBC < 1 by dividing by m(m–1) , ordered and ranked. 
For the purpose of allocating telescope time, the Borda count has the great benefit that it reflects the 
broad consensus of the community rather than being driven by simple majority voting.  It also has the 
strength that it is intrinsically relatively robust against attempts to distort the results by tactical voting.  
However, it should be borne in mind that there is also a result known as the Gibbard–Satterthwaite 
Theorem, which proves that any fair voting system in which there are more than two possible outcomes 
can always be subverted by tactical voting (Gibbard 1973, Satterthwaite 1975).  Although astronomers 
are largely an honest bunch of individuals who would not sink to such underhand tactics, one would like 
to do whatever is possible to remove even the possibility of such a subversion of the allocation process, 
which is where the concept of rewarding good refereeing comes in. 
  
Rewarding good refereeing 
Once again, there is already a body of research into designing incentives into a process to encourage the 
participants to behave honestly – a topic known generally in economics and game theory as 
“mechanism design.”  Indeed, some of the early work done in this field was specifically directed toward 
mitigating the effects of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem by introducing a system of punishments 
and rewards in voting systems (Groves & Ledyard 1977).  In the current context of time allocation on 
telescopes, where the voters are also the stakeholders, one can design particular effective incentives 
into the process: in a traditional liberal democracy, the worst that one can ethically do to voters who try 
to “cheat” through tactical voting is to arrange for their votes to carry less weight in the final tally, but 
here we can design a system that actively encourages the voters to consider the broader “good of 
society” through the incentive of increasing the chances of obtaining the direct personal gain of 
telescope time if they do so.  
This idea of rewarding desirable behaviour is not unprecedented in the allocation of telescope time at 
many observatories.  When astronomers build a new instrument to mount on a telescope, the benefit 
that they bring to the broader community by making the instrument generally available is frequently 
rewarded with what is known as “guaranteed time,” whereby they are “paid” with an allocation of 
observing time on the telescope.  Thus, the principle is already established that observatories reward 
socially desirable behaviour and a job well done with time on the telescope, so why shouldn’t referees 
also receive a modest boost to their observational programmes for doing a good job in the assessment 
process?   
It is also worth noting that minor reordering of the final list of applications through the distribution of 
relatively small rewards has very little impact on the global validity of the final list: proposals near the 
top of the list will be approved irrespective of such modest rearrangement, and those near the bottom 
will remain unsupported; it is only those in a “penumbra” of intermediate ranks that may change state 
on the basis of such minor incentives, and the general view is that the process is intrinsically fairly 
arbitrary when it comes to deciding which such mid-ranking applications should be supported.   
There are many ways in which one can assess how well each individual has carried out her task by 
predicting the final outcome in the global ordered list, which can be tailored to what is deemed 
important.  If, for example, a telescope is oversubscribed such that only a fraction f of applications can 
be awarded time, the ordering of the bottom of the list real does not matter very much, so one might 
reward an assessor for placing the same f  m applications at the top of his list that appear at the top of 
his sub-set of applications in the global list.  One particularly simple figure of refereeing merit, Qi, for 
applicant i could be derived from the absolute deviation of the rank order of his sub-list from the 
relative rank order in which the same applications appear in the global list,  
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so if i is a “perfect” assessor who exactly reflects the views of the community he would score Qi=1, while 
the normalization has been chosen such that if he is an “evil” assessor who deliberately placed the 
applications in exactly the wrong order then he would score Qi=0. 
One further nuance that could be implemented with a modest increase in computation would be to 
recalculate the global list excluding applicant i in each calculation of Qi.  Such a modification would 
effectively remove any influence of the individual on the averaged consensus when comparing the two 
to assess the quality of refereeing.  One could also envisage iterating the process, whereby a new ranked 
list is created with any referees with very low values of Qi excluded, thus producing an ordering that 
depends only on competent conscientious referees, more closely representing the consensus view of 
the community. 
Having calculated such a figure of merit, one has to decide what to do with it.  Since the purpose of this 
exercise is to reward those who take their refereeing duties seriously, but also potentially to penalize 
those who try to manipulate the process, one simple algorithm would be to move those who score 
above some critical value, Qgood, n places up the list, and to move all those who score less than some 
other critical values, Qbad, n places down the list, relative to those who score somewhere in the middle.  
The size of n would need some calibration, since one needs it to be large enough for applicants to view it 
as sufficient carrot to take it seriously, but not so large that it ends up dominating over the relative 
scientific merits of applications.  One natural choice would be to relate it to the scatter amongst the 
rankings of different assessors, since moves on this scale would be within the intrinsic uncertainty in the 
process, and so are justifiable as not unduly distorting the peer review process. 
 
A simulated allocation process 
As a test of whether this process might work in 
practice, we have set up a simulated telescope 
application round implementing the above 
procedure.  We have assumed that there are 
N=100 applicants, approximately in line with 
the number of applications that might be 
assessed within a single panel at present.  The 
true ordering of these applications by merit is 
specified in the simulation, and we model the 
intrinsic uncertainty in each referee’s personal 
assessment of these merits by assuming that 
she is fundamentally unable to distinguish 
between applications within n = 10 places of 
each other in this list, but otherwise can rank 
each application fairly against its competitors. 
Figure 1 shows what happens as one varies 
the number of applications m that each 
assessor is asked to rank.  Surprisingly, even if 
each participant only receives two 
applications to assess, the Modified Borda Count does a reasonable job of combining all the 
assessments and picking out the top applications, although clearly with significant quantization issues.  
As m increases, the scatter comes down so that by m=8 the error that the process might make is 
comparable to the intrinsic uncertainty.  It is also interesting to note that the scatter is smaller at the 
extremes of the distribution, as the intrinsic uncertainty in ranking becomes a one-sided process, so 
there are fewer possibilities for mis-ranking.  This effect is particularly advantageous in heavily-
oversubscribed application processes, as almost all of the successful applicants are likely to be drawn 
from the tightly-correlated upper tail.  
These simulations assume the ideal case where all assessors are honest and do a perfect job to within 
the intrinsic ten-place uncertainty.  Figure 2 shows what happens in a somewhat more realistic scenario, 
where 85% of referees are assumed to have this level of competence, 10% are so incompetent that they 
assign random ranks, and 5% are “evil,” and deliberately reverse the order of their rankings; while still 
somewhat idealized, such a distribution gives a sense of what impact these failing will have on the 
system.  Figure 2 also shows the improvement that one obtains in the final rankings by clipping out the 
less competent referees from the modified Borda count on the basis of the Q values obtained by 
comparing the individuals’ rankings with the global list.   
1:   Modified Borda Count returned when a sample of 100 
applications of known rank are sent to differing numbers m of the 
applicants for assessment. 
Figure 3 shows the associated distribution of values 
of Qi, demonstrating that it is fairly straightforward 
to use such a measure to distinguish between 
malicious, incompetent and competent referees.   
The separations of these classes also provide an 
indicator as to the critical values of Q that one might 
consider adopting to encourage applicants to take 
the refereeing process seriously: one could, for 
example, move all applicants that score Q > 0.6 up 
the list, and all those that score Q < 0.3 down the 
list, relative to those in the mid-range.  These plots 
even provide some indication as to how far it is 
appropriate to move applications in the list: since a 
move of up to ten places up or down the ranking is 
within the intrinsic scatter in the process, a move of 
up to this magnitude could provide a significant 
incentive without unduly distorting the outcome.  
Note also that such readjustments will have very 
little impact on the final list since the vast majority 
of referees have done an honest job so will not shift 
in rank relative to each other, but since the basic 
aim of this incentive is to encourage applicants to take the refereeing seriously, such a null impact is a 
desirable outcome in itself. 
 
Limitations 
Although this approach has benefits in terms of the 
manner in which the workload is distributed and the way it 
seeks to define a community consensus, it also has its 
shortcomings.  These shortcomings need to be addressed, 
and mechanisms considered to ameliorate them. 
For a start, this process is to some extent still dependent 
on the good will and honesty of the participants.  Since 
there is no direct scrutiny of each referee’s actions and no 
requirement to justify a ranking, there may be a 
temptation to not take the process seriously or even try to 
subvert it.  However, there is still the same obligation to 
declare conflicts of interest and otherwise behave in an 
ethical manner.  Further, the system more actively 
discourages cheating since, for example, anyone 
deliberately mis-grading a competitor’s application would 
end up damaging their own chances when their grades 
were found to be out of line with those of their peers.  
There is also the ethical matter of not stealing ideas from other peoples’ proposals that one is sent to 
assess, but this issue is really no different in a distributed model than it is in any other system of 
refereeing.   
One aspect of the current process that this method cannot reproduce is in providing feedback on 
individual proposals, beyond recording where in the final ranked list they lie.  However, the feedback 
2:  Modified Borda count returned in a rather more realistic 
mix of 85% competent, 10% incompetent, and 5% 
deliberately mis-ranking referees.  The solid points show 
the improvement in fit obtained after the identified "evil" 
referees are clipped from the scoring. 
3:  Distribution of measured refereeing quality as 
defined by the Q parameter.  Intrinsically competent 
referees are coloured green, incompetent ones are 
yellow, and evil ones are red. 
provided on the huge list of applications that most allocation committees assess is necessarily terse and 
often not very helpful.  Its loss would be offset by a process whereby applicants look at a significant 
range of other peoples’ proposals in every round, allowing them to see how others make their cases 
convincing.  A related concern is how more junior applicants such as students will be able to handle the 
refereeing requirement with little past experience.  However, since the purpose here is to integrate the 
refereeing into the application process, there is a natural mechanism for mentoring such applicants: just 
as more senior applicants on a proposal would be expected to provide input into writing a convincing 
case, so they would be expected to help train their more junior colleague in the assessment part of the 
process. 
There is also no mechanism for the referees to present “killer arguments” such as pointing out that the 
science was done back in 1982 or that the object is in the wrong hemisphere.  More technical aspects 
such as the object’s latitude can be dealt with in an automated fashion, but less obvious show-stoppers 
are harder to deal with.  However, experience on conventional allocation committees would suggest 
that such issues are rare and seldom clear-cut, and usually depend on the strength of personality of 
individuals on the panel as to whether or not the case is made.  There is something rather disturbing 
about relying on the advocacy skills of individuals, and indeed on whether or not there happens by 
chance to be a person with the right specialized knowledge on such a small panel, to make such 
decisions, so it is not clear that a more distributed system necessarily produces an inferior solution.  One 
could, in any case, envisage a final stage of the process in which the approved proposals are sent for 
vetting by expert referees with the sole purpose of confirming that such impediments do not exist: since 
only a small fraction of the total number of applications would be subject to this final hurdle of expert 
scrutiny, the workload involved would be very manageable.   
Perhaps the greatest potential concern is that this procedure will drive the allocation process toward 
conservative mediocrity, since referees will be dissuaded from supporting a long-shot application if they 
think it will put them out of line with the consensus.  This effect would need careful monitoring, but it 
could also be addressed explicitly in the instructions given to applicants as to the criteria they should 
apply in their assessments: if they are aware that all applicants have been encouraged to support 
scientifically-exciting speculative proposals, then they are likely to rank such applications highly 
themselves to remain in line with the consensus. 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we have presented a new distributed mechanism designed for assessing applications for 
observing time on major telescopes, but the method could also be used in many other academic 
contexts, such as the distribution of grant resources, or even deciding how to allocate limited talk slots 
in an over-subscribed conference so as to build a programme that most interests the participants.  It 
represents a rather radical departure from the current centralized mechanism for allocating telescope 
time, but it is clear that the present system is far from perfect and is painfully burdensome.  Given the 
inherently subjective nature of peer review, there really is no objective way to claim that this approach 
would be any better or worse than what we have at the moment in terms of outcome, while it is 
demonstrably more equitable and less onerous as a process.  However, since no-one has yet taken the 
bold step of implementing such a procedure, one of the authors cannot put off his return to poring over 
that fat file any longer… 
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